The supply and demand of credit are not always well aligned and matched, as is re ‡ected in the countercyclical excess reserve-to-deposit ratio and interest spread between the lending rate and the deposit rate. We develop a search-based theory of credit allocation to explain the cyclical ‡uctuations in bank reserves, the interest spread, as well as credit rationing. We show that search frictions in the credit market can not only naturally explain the countercyclical bank reserves, interest spread and credit rationing, but also generate endogenous business cycles driven primarily by the cyclical utilization rate of credit resources, as long conjectured by the Austrian school of the business cycle. In particular, we show that credit search can lead to endogenous increasing returns to scale and variable capital utilization in a model with constant returns to scale production technology and matching functions, thus providing a micro-foundation for the indeterminacy literature of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Wen (1998).
Introduction
theoretical interest, but also plays a non-trivial role in real-world …rm …nancing. As documented in Becchetti et al (2009) , around 20:24% of …rms are subject to credit rationing in the United States.
However, the literature on credit rationing is extremely thin despite the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) . Our search-theoretical approach provides a short cut to quantitatively study the business-cycle property credit rationing. Our framework is extremely simple. The benchmark model has three type of agents: a representative household with a continuum of ex anti identical members (depositors), a …nancial intermediary (bank) with a continuum of ex anti identical loan o¢ cers, and a continuum of …rms. The bank accepts deposits from the household and then lend credit to …rms. We assume there are search frictions between households and banks as well as between banks and …rms, similar to that in a standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) search-and-matching model of unemployment. As in the DMP model, our model features aggregate matching functions that determine the number of credit relationships between depositors and banks, and between bank loan o¢ cers and …rms. Such double search frictions create un-utilized savings and credit resources in equilibrium. For example, when bank deposits allocated to loan o¢ cers are not matched by …rms, they become idle (excess reserves) in the banking system, while …rms that are unmatched by loan o¢ cers are considered as being denied for credit. This simple matching friction and setup then explain the co-existence of "excess" reserves (analogous to unemployment) and credit rationing in the data. Since a booming economy encourages more …rm-entry into the credit market to search for creditors (lenders), it increases the matching probability of credit resources. As a result, the reserve-to-deposit ratio is countercyclical over the business cycle. In addition, since the deposit rate facing the households is determined mainly by its time preference and the lending rate facing …rms determined mainly by credit tightness and …rms' credit demand, the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate may also be countercyclical under aggregate shocks.
In addition, we show that such an endogenously elastic utilization rate of savings and credit resources due to search and matching can lead to endogenous aggregate increasing returns to scale (IRS) even though the underlying production and matching technologies both exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS). This endogenous source of IRS caused by procyclical credit utilization can lead to local indeterminacy and self-ful…lling credit cycles that feature a strong and powerful multiplier-accelerator propagation mechanism.
To understand the intuition, consider an anticipated increase in labor productivity by …rms (in the absence of technology shocks). This would increase …rms'labor demand and hence households' labor supply as well as household savings. The increase in household savings would then raise bank's credit supply and reduce the deposit rate, which would then lower the interest rate on loans and induce more …rm to enter the credit market to search for loans. More …rm entry in turn would increase the matching probability of bank loans, raising the e¤ective capital stock used in …rms'production, ratifying the initial optimistic expectation of higher labor productivity. Hence, a proportionate increase in household labor supply and savings would render …rms'e¤ective capital stock and aggregate production to increase more than proportionally, leading to endogenous IRS.
Note that the IRS originate from a subtle pecuniary externality (based on …rm entry and search) instead of technological externality. Also, as the matching probability of bank loans increases, the bank is able to pay a proportionately higher deposit rate relative to the loan rate, leading to countercyclical interest spread. This will increase the rate of return to saving even for those households who do not increase their saving rate and decrease the cost of credit (interest payments) even for those …rms that do not increase their borrowings, further reinforcing the positive feedback loop among saving, credit, and investment, as emphasized by the Austrian school.
The endogenously arising IRS in our model are appealing for several reasons. First, aggregate demand shocks like preference shocks or government spending shocks are now able to generate pos-itive business cycle comovements among aggregate consumption, investment, and output. Demand shocks are widely believed to be important sources of business cycles, yet in standard RBC models they generally produce a negative comovement between consumption and investment. Second, the standard RBC model has been criticized for requiring large technology shocks to produce realistic business cycles (see King and Rebelo (1999) for a survey of the literature). Thanks to the endogenous IRS in our model, small shocks (either demand or supply shocks) can generate large business cycle ‡uctuations. Third, our model can generate indeterminacy and self-ful…lling business cycles with hump-shaped output responses without productive externalities as in the model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Wen (1998) .
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, the search friction is in line with approaches proposed by Den Haan, Ramey and Waston (2003) , Wasmer and Weil (2004) , and
Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013 Our model also provides a micro foundation for the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) Finally, our model is in the same spirit of Acemoglu (1996) , who shows that search friction in labor market generate increasing returns to human capital accumulation in a two-period model. In his model, the workers have to make human capital investments before they enter the labor market.
An increased in the average human capital investment induce more physical investments from …rms.
So even some of workers who have not increased their humane capital will earn a higher return on their human capital if matched with …rms. In other words, search friction produce a positive pecuniary externality similar to the mechanism in our model. However, unlike Acemoglu (1996) , we focus on search in credit market and explore its implication on indeterminacy and self-ful…lling expectation driven business cycles in an in…nite-period model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the baseline model and examines its key properties. Section 3 studies the model's business cycle implications under calibrated parameter values. Section 4 concludes the paper with remarks for future research.
2 The Benchmark Model
Environment
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by three types of agents: a representative household composed of a continuum of depositors, a representative and perfectly competitive bank (…nancial intermediary, FI) composed of a continuum of clerks or loan o¢ cers, and a continuum of …rms. The household owns capital and …rms, makes decision on labor supply and consumption, and deposits its savings into the bank, which then lends the deposits to …rms. To break the conventionally assumed accounting identity between saving and investment (following a key idea of the Austrian school and Keynes), we assume search frictions among the three types of agents.
Figure 3. Timeline
The time line of events in a time interval between t and t + dt is as follows. First, depositors from the representative household deposit the existing household savings (carried over from the last period) to the bank through search and match between depositors and bank clerks. Then the decentralized credit market opens, where the …nancial intermediary (loan o¢ cers) and …rms randomly meet. In order to enter the credit market, a …rm needs to pay a …xed cost. If matched with a loan, trading surplus is split between the …rm and the bank and the credit relationship is then dissolved. The actual number of …rms is determined by the free entry condition to the credit market, namely the expected surplus from a successful match equals to the …xed cost. Finally, the household pools wage income and pro…t incomes from the bank and …rms and then makes decision on consumption and capital accumulation (next-period savings). The whole process is repeated again in the next time interval between t + dt and t + 2dt.
To facilitate the analysis, we can imagine that a continuum of depositors from the household exerting e¤orts to search and match with a continuum of bank clerks or loan o¢ cers. Denote S as the total savings of the household. Due to search frictions, only e S < S units of savings are successfully matched and deposited into the banking system. After that, each loan o¢ cer is assigned with an equal fraction of the e S units of deposits and goes out searching for potential borrows (…rms).
We show that such a simple setup leads to a simple dynamic system that can generate (i) countercyclical excess reserve-to-deposit ratio, (ii) countercyclical interest spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate, and (iii) self-ful…lling business cycles with strong ampli…cation and propagation mechanisms.
Deposit Search
We …rst consider search frictions between the household and the bank. The matching function between household members and bank clerks is
the e¤ort choose by household depositors. There is unit measure of household depositors and bank clerks, i:e:, H t = B t = 1. Therefore, for each unit of savings, the expected revenue is
subject to
where e t denotes the fraction of aggregate savings successfully deposited into the banking system.
The …rst-order conditions (FOCs) are
Notice that e S t = e t S t : 
which is convex in the proportion (e t ) of savings the household puts into the bank. Then we can formulate the constrained optimization problem of the representative household. The life time utility of the representative household (consumer) is given by
where C t is consumption, N t is labor supply, > 0 is the discount factor, > 0 controls the utility weight on labor supply, and > 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The household faces the following budget constraint,
where S t is the total capital stock of the households, W t is the real wage, R d t is the deposit interest rate committed by the bank, and t is the net pro…t from all …rms and banks. The right hand of equation (8) is the total income of the households, which can be consumed, or used for capital accumulation. We use _ S t to denote the change in the capital stock. The …rst order conditions of the household are given by
Loan Search
The credit market consists of a large number of credit lenders (loan o¢ cers) and borrowers (…rms).
More speci…cally, there are B t number of loan o¢ cers and V t number of …rms. Each …rm needs to pay a …xed cost t in terms of capital to enter the credit market before it can search for a lender.
Each loan o¢ cer carries
e St Bt unit of capital and each …rms demand 1 unit of capital. They randomly meet with each other. If they are matched, they can produce
units of output, where n t is labor input of a matched …rm. The search friction is captured by a matching technology M (B; V ), where B and V denote respectively the measure of loan o¢ cers and that of …rms. As is standard in the search literature, we assume M (B; V ) is homogeneous of degree one in both augments. To make the results sharp and tractable, we also assume a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, M (B; V ) = B 1 " V " , with " 2 (0; 1). The probability that a …rm can match with a credit supplier is
and the probability that a loan o¢ cer can match with a borrower (…rm) is given by
Here B V is the credit market tightness. Without loss of generality, we normalize the measure of loan o¢ cers to B = 1. Then we have
For simplicity, we assume that any matched credit relationship is dissolved at the end of each period. 2
Given real wage w t , the matching surplus can be determined by solving
where y t = A t e S t n 1 t . It is easy to show that
Notice that t depends only on the aggregate variables at time t. The surplus is split between the …rm and the loan o¢ cer by Nash bargaining. More speci…cally the …rm obtain 2 [0; 1] fraction of surplus. Denote R l t as the interest rate on loans or the returns to the bank, Nash bargaining then yields
The free entry condition for the …rms is then given by
Then equation (13) can be rewritten as
The above equation states that q t must decrease with the match surplus. The intuition is as follows.
A higher match surplus will induce more …rms to enter, hence reduces the probability of each …rm's match with credit suppliers.
The banking sector is perfectly competitive and thus makes zero pro…t in equilibrium. The bank needs to pay the depositors at the interest rate R d t , and earn the rate of return R l t (the lending interest rate) with probability p t . The bank pools all pro…t income at the end of the day. Therefore the zero pro…t condition is given by
where p t is given by equation (14). This equation captures the interest spread.
Finally the aggregate net pro…t income distributed to the household is given by
where the second equality follows from the law of large number.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium is a collection of prices {W t ; R d t ; R l t } and quantities n C t ; S t ; N t ; t ; t ; n t ; e S t ; K t ; e t ; p t ; q t o such that (i) given prices and aggregate pro…t income t ; the allocation fC t ; S t ; N t g solves household's utility maximization problem de…ned in (7); (ii) the surplus t and labor input n t for a successfully matched …rm are de…ned by (18) and (17); (iii) given the probability q t of being matched with a bank loan o¢ cer, the equilibrium number of …rms V t is determined by the free entry condition (20); (iv) given the bank's probability of matching with a …rm (p t ), the bank earns zero expected pro…t as characterized by (22); (v) the probability q t and p t are determined by (13) and (14), and all markets clear.
Since each match on the household side utilizes e S t = e t S t units of capital, and each match on the …rm side utilizes K t = p t e S t units of capital, given the total initial available credit resources S t , the fraction of aggregate credit resources being utilized in production is hence given by
where we have used the normalization B t = 1. As each matched …rm employs n t units of labor, the labor market equilibrium then requires
Finally, the total output produced by all …rms is given by
where K t = u t e S t = u t e t S t . The surplus from a successful match is then given by
which equals to the marginal product of aggregate capital.
Equation (17) and (25) then yield
The deposit rate is then given by
The last equality is obtained by using K t = V t q t e S t and u t = p t = V t q t . Since K t = e t u t S t , the aggregate production function can also be written as
When output increases, the demand for credit increases, hence it is easier for the credit suppliers to be matched with …rms.
Finally, since B t = 1, and u t = p t = " t , the aggregate entry costs V satisfy
where 0 (1+ ) 1+ and 1 "
1.
Simpli…ed Transition Dynamics
First, combining Equations (11), (22), (19) and (27) yields
and thus 
where e e (1 )
Secondly, as shown in Equation (31)
Combining Equation (??) and Equation (35) yields
where e u h (1+ ) 1. Consequently, we can reduced the dynamics system of fC t ; S t ; N t ; W t ; R d t ; R l t ; t ; K t ; e t ; u t ; q t ; t ; Y t ; V t g to the following simpler system in fC t ; S t ; e t ; u t ; Y t g:
where (e t ) = 0 e 1+ t 1+ . Then we have the following Proposition 1 The aggregate production function in equation (39) exhibits IRS in household capital (S t ) and labor supply (N t ):
and
Proof: Substituting Equation (34) and Equation (36) into Equation (30) yields Equation (43).
Notice that we obtain aggregate IRS in household capital S t and labor supply N t despite the lack of Benhabib-Farmer type production externalities. This is due to the endogenous feedback and reinforcing loop between the utilization rate of aggregate savings, aggregate credit resources, and …rms'e¤ective capital stock, as suggested by Equations (30) and (36). Meanwhile, we also obtain the ampli…cation e¤ect on productivity shock, i:e:,
Our endogenous IRS model based on credit search is isomorphic to the models of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Wen (1998) . Namely, our model also gives rise to local indeterminacy and self-ful…lling business cycles based on an endogenous ampli…cation and propagation mechanism. To understand the intuition, consider a proportional increase in aggregate labor and capital supply from households. In a standard neoclassical model without credit search, such a proportional increase in labor and capital supply would only increase aggregate output one-for-one. However, in our model the increase of household savings leads to a higher credit supply in the banking system, which in turn would reduce the cost of borrowing and hence induce more …rm to enter the credit market, which in turn increases the match probability of credit resources, raising the e¤ective capital stock used in the production more than one-for-one and resulting in more than proportionate increase in aggregate output.
In addition to generating social IRS, the initial increase in household labor and capital supply can also become self-ful…lling. As the e¤ective capital used in production increases, the returns to labor supply also increase for every household, reinforcing the initial increase in household labor supply. In addition, as the matching probability of bank increases, bank is able to pay a higher deposit rate. This will increase the returns to saving even for the households who do not increase their savings. Hence, the social increasing returns to scale originate from a subtle pecuniary externality that reinforces and multiplies itself in a positive feedback loop just like in the model of technological production externalities.
Hosios Condition and Welfare
Since we have used random search to characterize frictions in the credit market, it is natural for us to check whether the Hosios (1990) condition holds in our environment. Given (A t ; S t ; N t ), i:e:, if we control the technology and the supply of capital and labor, then the Hosios condition is obtained by solving the following constrained optimization problem of the social planner:
Using the notation adopted in the baseline model, we can rewrite the social planner's problem as
The FOCs are given by
Then we have Corollary 1 Given (A t ; S t ; N t ), The ratio of output in the decentralized economy to that in the social planner economy is 
Proof: Substituting Equations (30) and (30) into Equation (30) yields
where e Y SP = the other hand, a higher dampens the pro…t share of the bank by lowering the loan rate, which translates into a lower deposit rate, and therefore discourages the search e¤ort of household for the decision of deposit making. Therefore = " "+" H strikes a balance between these two competing e¤ects. In particular, increases with " (the matching elasticity of …rms searching for credit) and
decreases with " H (the matching elasticity of household searching for …nancial intermediation). Finally, in deriving the Hosios conditions we have so far followed the literature by holding the supply of labor and capital as …xed. This restriction is …ne when it comes to the standard setup of macro labor economics a la DMP, which typically assumes inelastic labor supply and does not take into account capital accumulation, in addition to the assumption of risk neutral …rms and workers. However, our paper has to address both of these two issues since the household in our model is allowed to make decision on labor supply as well as capital accumulation. Moreover, the household is risk averse when it comes to consumption. As a result, neither the classic nor the modi…ed Hosios condition can guarantee a constrained optimum in welfare. Instead, we have to take into account the e¤ect of on both consumption and leisure decisions of the household over the lifetime horizon. To do so, we …rst obtain the steady state as follows:
Note that we set 0 = (1+ ) such that e = 1 in steady state, where 1 " H 1. Consequently we know that the household welfare in the steady state is
which is a function of , the bargaining power of …rms. Figure 4 indicates that in the presence of risk aversion, endogenous capital accumulation, and elastic labor supply, neither the standard Hosios condition (i:e:, = ") nor the modi…ed Hosios condition (i:e:, = " "+" H ) manage to maximize the true welfare function .
Indeterminacy Analysis
Lemma 1 Using the dynamic system established above, we can obtain the following simpler twodimensional system:
where (74)
and thus
Using the transition dynamics in Section 5 yields
Some algebraic manipulation yields Lemma 1.
The local dynamics around the steady state is then determined by the eigenvalues of J. If both eigenvalues of J are negative, then the model is indeterminate. As a result, the model can experience endogenous ‡uctuations driven by sunspots. The eigenvalues of J, x 1 and x 2 , satisfy
x 1 x 2 = Det(J) = 2 1 + 1 1 ( s c 1) ;
We know that indeterminacy emerges if and only if T race (J) < 0 and Det (J) > 0. 
2. 2 [ 1 2 ; 1); " H 2 [0; 1] and 0 " < 1 1.
Proof: We can prove that T race (J) < 0 and Det (J) > 0 hold if and only if the following four conditions hold, in addition to the restriction that "; " H 2 [0; 1] :
" < 1 1:
First, since " H 2 [0; 1], then comparing Conditions (86) and (89) suggests that the former is never binding.
Secondly, note that 1 " H 1. Thus the Condition (88) can be rewritten as
Since 0;
so we know that Condition (88) is not binding.
Finally, if 2 [ 1 2 ; 1), then we know that 1 1 2 (0; 1], and we must have 0 " < 1 1.
Besides, we know that e " 1 1 1 1+ > 2 when 2 [ 1 2 ; 1). Therefore Condition (87) always holds in this case. In contrast, when 2 0; 1 2 , we have 1 1 > 1 > ", and thus Condition (89) always holds. Meanwhile, since " + " H 2, to guarantee that Condition (87) can be satis…ed, we must have e " 
This just a special case of Proposition 2.
With Search Only Between Firms and Banks
In our model, search between …rms and banks leads to IRS isomorphic to the model of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) , while adding search between households and banks generates a credit utilization function isomorphic to the capacity utilization model of Wen (1998) . Hence, our credit searchbased model provides a microfoundation for the indeterminacy literature pioneered by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Wen (1998) .
Notice that, if " H = 0, i:e:, there is no household search, then e t = 1 and we obtain
In turn, the aggregate production becomes
where s , n (1 ) , 1 1 " , and
which is isomorphic to the Benhabib-Farmer model. On the other hand, if " H > 0, then we obtain the Wen (1998) 
In the absence of household search, the depreciation rate is exogenously given. In turn, the dynamics are accordingly modi…ed as
As we have already shown, when " H = 0, then indeterminacy is not possible although we have endogenous IRS. Hence, household search is necessary to generate indeterminacy, analogous to Wen's (1998) …nding that variable capacity utilization can signi…cantly reduce the required degree of IRS in the Benhabib-Farmer model for indeterminacy.
3 Quantitative Exercise
Calibration
We calibrate our model to quarterly frequency. The time discounting factor is = 1 1 = 0:01, where = 0:99 denotes the standard discount factor in discrete time models. We set the capital's share = 0:33, the coe¢ cient of labor disutility = 1:75 and the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply = 0 (indivisible labor).
Now we have to calibrate the values of (" H ; ; ; ; "), which are speci…c to our model. First, as proved in previous section, R d = (1+ ) where 1 " H 1. Since R d = 5:4%, we immediately know that " H = 0:82 and = 0:23. In addition, our model implies = = 4:3%, which is basically in line with the standard calibration of = 3:5%. Second, we have shown that S Y = (1 ) R d . Given a capital-output ratio of 5 and a deposit rate of 5:4%, the bargaining power of …rm can be obtained as = 1 R d S Y = 0:19. Third, we interpret as the cost of intermediation to …nance …rm investment. Therefore, we set = 0:1 according to Chen and Ritter (2000) . Finally, we use the following moments to jointly determine ( ; "). On the one hand, u = R l R d = 67% and we also know that u is related to ( ; "). Thus we obtain one constraint on ( ; "). On the other hand, Becchetti et al (2009) show that the proportion of …rms subject to credit rationing is around 20:42%, and we know that q = 1 " = 79:58%. Since is also related to ( ; "), the moment on bank's credit utilization and that on …rm's credit rationing jointly implies that = 0:79 and " = 0:57. Our calibration exercise shows that " H + " > 1. Consequently, indeterminacy due to credit search is empirically plausible. The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 1 . As documented in Ruckes (2004) and the references therein, the lending standards are countercyclical. It in turn implies that credit rationing is also counter-cyclical. As shown in the last column in Figure 6 , TFP shocks and matching e¢ ciency shocks generate the opposite predictions for the correlation between output and credit rationing, thus may help quantitatively identify the relative importance of various business cycle shocks.
Impulse Responses
This subsection investigates the dynamic e¤ect of TFP shocks and matching e¢ ciency shocks ( t ) on aggregate output, the interest spread, the utilization rate of credit (the opposite of the reserveto-deposit ratio), and credit rationing. Figure 6A shows that under a 1% TFP shock, both the reserve-to-deposit ratio (the negative of the top-right panel) and interest spread (lower-left panel)
are countercyclical, consistent with the data. However, the tightness of credit rationing (lower-right panel), or the fraction of …rms denied for credit, is procyclical. Figure 6B shows that a 1% credit matching e¢ ciency shock can also generate countercyclical reserve-to-deposit ratio and interest spread. In addition, it also generates a countercyclical credit rationing (i.e., negative response of the fraction of …rms denied for credit), consistent with data. Figure 6A . Impulse Responses to TFP shock.
Also notice the more than proportionate increase (the multiplier e¤ect) and the hump-shaped pattern (the accelerator e¤ect) of the impulse responses in output and other variables. This endogenous propagation mechanism or multiplier-accelerator e¤ect is the consequence of the endogenous increasing returns to the utilization rate of credit resources due to search and matching. Hence, under a favorable aggregate shock, as more and more credit resources are unleashed from the banking sector into the production sector, the economy goes through a long period of sustained boom featuring excessively low reserve-to-deposit ratio and interest spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate. However, the credit boom also plants the seed for its future bust. As the credit resources in the banking sector become scarcer, the loanable funds rate rises more than proportionately than does the deposit rate, which will soon or later chock o¤ both credit supply and demand, and generate an investment slump. Figure 6B . Impulse Responses to Matching E¢ ciency Shock ( ).
Conclusion
The critical role that credit supply and …nancial intermediation play in generating and amplifying the business cycle has long been noted by economists at least since the Austrian school, as manifested in the countercyclical excess reserve-to-deposit ratio, the countercyclical interest spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate, as well as the countercyclical proportion of …rms subject to credit rationing. This paper provides a framework to rationalize the Austrian theory and the observed credit cycles. Our framework is based on a simple idea. In an industrial economy with the division of labor and segregation between demand and supply, savers (lenders) with "idle" credit resources need to search and be matched with investors (borrowers) to utilize the available saving/credit resources and make them productive. But search and matching are costly due to in-formation frictions and transaction costs and it requires e¤orts and bilateral coordination between borrowers and lenders. Hence, in equilibrium, credit resources are not always fully utilized, creating an important margin for elastic credit supply due to endogenous utilization rate of available credit resources. Meanwhile, the under-utilization of credit resources coexists with the prevalence of credit rationing to …rms. Therefore our work o¤ers a dynamic framework to address credit frictions on both the supply and demand sides at the same time. We demonstrate that aggregate shocks to matching e¢ ciency in the credit market appear to be most important for the counter-cyclicality of excess reserves, interest spread, as well as credit rationing. Finally, we show that such a margin of elastic credit supply turns out critical not only in understanding the credit cycle, but also in leading to endogenous social increasing returns to the utilization rate of capital, hence providing a microfoundation for the powerful ampli…cation and propagation mechanism underling the endogenous business cycle literature studied by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Wen (1998) .
